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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ILLINOIS BRICK: THE DEATH KNELL OF
ULTIMATE CONSUMER ANTITRUST SUITS
INTRODUCTION

Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits "[a]ny person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws" to recover treble damages in a civil suit against
the wrongdoer.' This section would appear to establish a remedy for
anyone whose economic interests are adversely affected by illegal
monopolistic practices. Most federal courts, however, have found it
necessary to place restrictions upon the categories of injured persons
who may maintain an action under section 4.2 These restrictions
stem, in large part, from the courts' recognition that activities in a
relatively isolated sector of the economy may often affect a wide
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
I See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972) (not all injuries
that are traceable to antitrust law violations are compensable under the Clayton Act); Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1273 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1073 (1976) (remote parties with speculative injuries should be denied standing under the
Clayton Act); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (it has been necessary for federal courts to limit scope of civil
antitrust remedy); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 707 (3d Cir. 1910) (only parties
who have been directly injured should be permitted to recover); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970) (severity of the treble damage penalty has
led courts to limit classes of plaintiffs with standing to sue under the Clayton Act). But see
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (civil
antitrust remedy available to all parties injured by illegal practices). Several commentators
have noted the tendency of the federal courts to limit the scope of section 4 of the Clayton
Act. See 15 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION § 115.01[1] (1978)
[hereinafter cited as VON KAuNowsKi]; Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements for Antitrust Plaintiffs: Judicially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. REv.
205, 206-07 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Alioto & Donnici]; Beane, Antitrust: Standing and
Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 331, 333 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Beane]; Pollock, The
"Injury" and "Causation"Elements of a Treble-DamageAntitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
691, 698-99 (1963); Schaeffer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 883 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Schaeffer]; Comment, Mangano and Ultimate-ConsumerStanding: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 394 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ultimate-Consumer
Standing].
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spectrum of economic interests.' Thus, absent some judicially imposed limitations upon the availability of section 4, a party4 who has
violated an antitrust law would be faced with the possibility of
virtually limitless civil liability.5 In view of the treble damage provisions of the Clayton Act, such a possibility presents almost as serious a threat to the American economic system as do the evils which
the antitrust statutes themselves were designed to prevent.'
In an attempt to limit the number of potential plaintiffs, the
federal courts have focused primarily upon the relationship between
the antitrust violator and the injured party.' Under this approach,
if an injured party's relationship to the violator is remote, he may
See Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-on,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 976, 978 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Standing to Sue].
Throughout this Note, terms such as party, seller, purchaser, customer, manufacturer,
intermediary, wholesaler, plaintiff, defendant, wrongdoer, and violator will be treated as
though they referred to individuals. This has been done to preserve stylistic consistency. In
most instances, however, these terms actually will refer to corporations or other aggregate
entities.
5 See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 943 (1969). Generally, the question whether an antitrust violator intended to injure
a particular plaintiff is not determinative in establishing that plaintiff's right to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 189 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to
Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 374, 388-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sherman].
' The purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve the integrity of the competitive market
system. Some commentators, however, have expressed concern that the uncertainties and
severe penalties inherent in these laws present a serious threat to the health of private
industry. In Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of
Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 660-66 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Handler & Blechman], the authors observe that, at least in the area of retail pricefixing, antitrust offenders are most likely to be small, local tradesmen and professionals such
as doctors and lawyers. Enforcing the treble damages penalty against these businessmen, in
the authors' view, would present an unfair hardship and drive many otherwise viable businesses out of the marketplace. In Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 908-11, the author argues that
certain monopolistic practices actually may have beneficial economic and social effects.
Thus, overdeterrence of antitrust violations may lead to unanticipated economic difficulties.
Accordingly, the author suggests that some antitrust violations must be tolerated if our
economic system is to remain stable. Id.
Schaeffer also notes, however, that despite the stringent treble damage penalty antitrust violations may be profitable for the wrongdoer under certain circumstances. As a result
of judicial construction of § 4, the wrongdoer is not required to pay interest on the fruits of
its misconduct until a final judgment has been entered. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973)
(interest on monies recovered as penalties not available under federal law). In view of the
protracted nature of antitrust litigation the pre-judgment, interest-free use of its illegal profit
may produce substantial economic benefits for the defendant. Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 90811. See also Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and
Treble Damages in Private Antitrust Litigation, 5 AxnTRUST L. & ECON. REv. 101 (1972).
1 See note 23 and accompanying text infra.
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be precluded from making a civil claim.' The remoteness issue is
often raised in cases where an illegally fixed price9 has been absorbed by a purchaser who has not dealt directly with the wrongdoer.10 In such cases, the purchaser has acquired the product in
question through one or more intermediaries who simply incorporated the overcharge in their price and passed it on to the next
purchaser in the chain of distribution. While section 4 clearly authorizes a party in privity with the wrongdoer to maintain an action
for damages," until recently it was uncertain whether an indirect
purchaser who ultimately absorbs the illegal overcharge should be
permitted to sue under the statute. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,2
the Supreme Court rejected this "passing-on" theory of liability and
held that the injury sustained by a purchaser who absorbs a passedon overcharge is too remote, as a matter of law, to support a civil
antitrust action under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 3 This decision
is expected to have a dampening if not deadening effect upon the
growing trend toward affording the ultimate consumer a civil remedy for illegal practices that impair his economic interests. In addition, the Illinois Brick decision appears to bring the Court into
direct conflict with congressional initiatives that were designed to
further this trend." This Note will discuss the background and implications of this conflict, including the impact that the Illinois
Brick decision can be expected to have upon the emerging field of
consumer antitrust law.
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
'Price-fixing has been held to be unlawful per se. See, e.g., United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940).
10 In an action for treble damages under § 4, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he has been injured in his business or property.
VoN KALNOWS, supra note 2, § 115.02[1]; see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1968) (citing Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906)), the Supreme Court noted that illegal overcharging produces
an "injury to property" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. See Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See
generally Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-on Defense: The Hanover
Shoe Decision, 13 ANTTUST BuLL. 1183, 1185-86 (1968). The Eighth Circuit, however, recently has held that a consumer who pays an illegal overcharge suffers no competitive injury
to his "business or property" and therefore does not have standing to sue under § 4. Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., [1978] TmDE REG. RaP. (CCH) 62,098 (8th Cir. June 19, 1978).
11See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
B

1i 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
'3 Id. at 728-29.
"

See notes 94-122 and accompanying text infra.
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THE RIGHT TO SUE-A HISTORY OF CONFUSION

The purpose of the civil treble damage remedy for antitrust
violations was two-fold. It was intended to provide compensation for5
economic injury sustained as a result of certain illegal practices,
and was designed to promote national antitrust policies by encouraging private enforcement of the relevant statutes. 6 In this context,
the civil treble damage penalty traditionally has been viewed as a
vital and effective weapon for combating monopolistic
practices and
7
preserving a competitive economic system.
In determining whether a particular plaintiff can maintain an
action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 8 the court must balance
15 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); E. TMBERLAKE,
FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGEs ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 3.01 (1965) [hereinafter cited as TIMBERLAKE]; VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 115.0111]; Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy:
The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Law, 43 So.
CAL. L. REV. 570, 592 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wrongs Without Remedy].
1 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969);
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne
Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 301 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976); Mulvey v.
Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971);
TIMBERLAKE, supra note 15, § 3.01; J. VAN CISE, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 61 (3d rev. ed.

1975);

VON KALINOWSKI,

supra note 2, § 115.01[1].

"' See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136, 139
(1968); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750 (1947); Alioto & Donnici, supra note 2, at 206; Schaeffer,
supra note 2, at 907; Standing to Sue, supra note 3, at 992-93. But see Wheeler, Antitrust
Treble-DamageActions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (1973).
Several commentators have observed that the criminal provisions of the antitrust laws,
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970), have not been particularly effective in deterring violations. See
AMERicAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARcH, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 7,
ANTITRUST PARENS PATRIAE BILL 37-38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No.
7] (citing J. Meehan, Jr. & H. Mann, Antitrust Policy and Allocative Efficiency:
Incompatible? (paper presented at a seminar on Problems of Regulation and Public Utilities,
Dartmouth College, Aug. 30, 1973)); Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 671-73; Comment,
To Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class Action Act, 13 HARv. J. LEGis. 776, 77981 (1976). Congress may have implicitly recognized the ineffectiveness of the existing penalties as deterrents when it increased the maximum fines and jail terms for antitrust violations.
Act of December 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (amending sections 1
to 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976)). It has been suggested, however, that the
statutory penalties are ineffective deterrents because the courts are reluctant to impose severe
criminal sanctions on corporate officers who appear before them as defendants. Schaeffer,
supra note 2, at 907. Thus, the additional penalties may not have the expected effect of
discouraging antitrust violations.
" Whether a remote injured party may recover treble damages frequently has been
treated as a standing problem. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers,
Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Carnivale Bag
Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General
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these important policy considerations against a variety of other factors, including evidentiary difficulties and the need to minimize
burdens upon the federal judiciary. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's posture on this conflict has been somewhat ambiguous. In
Radovich v. National Football League,'9 for example, the Court
stated that, in view of the congressional policy favoring private antitrust actions, "this Court should not add requirements to burden
the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress
in [the antitrust] laws."" ° Since section 4 requires only that the
party seeking damages show injury resulting from illegal activity,
the Radovich Court seemed to favor a very broad right to sue. Without repudiating the policy enunciated in Radovich, however, the
Court adopted a strikingly narrower view in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 2 1 when it stated that "Congress did not intend the antitrust
laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." This apparent
failure of the Supreme Court to develop a consistent policy on the
scope of the right to sue under section 4 resulted in confusing and
disparate decisions in the lower federal courts.2s
Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Several commentators have suggested, however,

that the use of the term standing to describe the question raised by the passing-on theory is
misleading and that the issue is really one of establishing the legal relationships among the
various parties to the transaction. See, e.g., Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 644-46;

Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing to Sue
and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Aft, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351, 365-66 (1971);
McGuire, The Passing-OnDefense and the Right of Remote Purchasersto Recover Treble
Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 177, 179-81 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
McGuire].
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected use of
the standing approach to the passing-on question. The Court observed that "the question of
which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is analytically
distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them
standing to sue for damages under § 4." 431 U.S. at 728 n.7 (citation omitted).
19352 U.S. 445 (1957).

454. In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948), the Court expressed a similarly broad view when it noted that "[tihe statute does
not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers ...
The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of
21 Id. at

[its] forbidden practices.
V1 405

.

. ."

Id. at 236 (citations omitted).

U.S. 251 (1972).
22 Id. at 263 n.14.
23 See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 28 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Handler, Innovations]; Note, Standing To Sue in Private Antitrust
Litigation: Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REv. 532, 533-34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
PrivateAntitrust Litigation].
A variety of sometimeT overlapping and often ambiguous judicial tests were devised to
address the multiplicity of "standing" problems which arose in the district and circuit courts
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in § 4 suits. Of these tests, among the earliest and simplest to apply was the "direct injury"
test enunciated in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910), and apparently
approved by the Supreme Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245
U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918). Under this test, in order to maintain a suit under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, the plaintiff was required to be either in privity or in direct competition with the
wrongdoer. In articulating the rationale for the direct injury test, the Supreme Court noted
that "[t]he general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond
the first step." 245 U.S. at 534. Thereafter, this test was widely used in the federal courts.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 230, 233 (D. Mass.), affl'd,
272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 316-17
(E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
For a discussion of the direct injury test, see Ultimate-ConsumerStanding, supra note 2, at
399 n.26; Private Antitrust Litigation, supra, at 535; Standing to Sue, supra note 3, at 97779. The privity requirement, however, was apparently rejected in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,
395 U.S. 642 (1969). See VON KALINowsKi, supra note 2, § 115.02[4]. See also South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
934 (1966). Despite the earlier rejection of the privity requirement in antitrust suits, the
recent Supreme Court rulings in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481 (1968), and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), appear to have restored the
rule, at least in cases involving passed-on overcharges.
A more popular approach among the lower federal courts has been the "target area" test,
which focuses upon the area of the economy affected by the illegal practice rather than the
relationship between the litigants. This test was aptly described by the Ninth Circuit in
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
919 (1952), wherein the court stated that, in order to sue under § 4, the plaintiff must show
not only "that an act has been committed which harms him," but also "that he is within
that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a
particular industry." 193 F.2d at 54-55. See also Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
930 (1972). In Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977), the court elaborated upon this definition when it stated
that "[olne need not be sitting on the bull's-eye in order'to be within the target area of an
antitrust conspiracy." Id. at 1361 (footnote omitted). In Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard
Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976), the court reached a rather
anomalous result by using the target area test. The plaintiffs, suppliers of electricity to
consumers, alleged that the defendant fuel supplier had engaged in a conspiracy to boycott
Arab oil dealers, with the result that the plaintiffs had been forced to pay illegally inflated
prices for its oil. 521 F.2d at 1272-73. Although the plaintiffs were in privity with the defendant and had been directly and foreseeably injured, they were denied recovery under the
target area test. The court reasoned that since the Arab suppliers, rather than the plaintiffs,
had been the real target of the conspiracy, the plaintiffs "were not the objects of the alleged
antitrust violation." Id. at 1273-74. The plaintiffs, however, were permitted to recover under
an alternative theory. Id. at 1296. For a detailed discussion of the target area test, see Alioto
& Donnici, supra note 2, at 207-10; Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a
Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 691, 706-07 (1963); Note, The Effect of
Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-onDoctrine, 46 So. CAL. L. Rav. 98, 99100 (1972); Standing to Sue, supra note 3, at 977-79. See generally PrivateAntitrust Litigation, supra.
At least two variations on this test, the "proximate target area" test and the "foreseeable
target area" test, have been applied to determine standing in civil antitrust actions. The
proximate target area test has been described as follows: "If a plaintiff can show himself
within the sector of the economy in which the violation threatened a breakdown of competitive conditions and that he was proximately injured thereby, then he has standing to sue
under section 4." South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414,
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The "right to sue" issue presented a particular problem when
suit was brought to recover for an illegal overcharge resulting from
price-fixing conspiracies." Theoretically, the legal wrong occurs
when the wrongdoer sells his product to the direct purchaser at an
unlawfully inflated price. 25 In situations involving complex distribu418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (emphasis added). As one commentator
observed, however, the results in cases using the proximate target area test may not differ
substantially from those that use the original target area test. PrivateAntitrust Litigation,
supra, at 541. For further discussion of the proximate target area test, see Dailey v. Quality
School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel
C6rp., 394 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affl'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
The foreseeable target area test was first used in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955), in which the plaintiff, Karseal, alleged that Richfield's illegal
practices had injured certain independent retailers who bought Karseal's products through
wholesalers. The plaintiff argued that its own business had been diminished because the
retailers were no longer able to buy its products. In granting relief to the plaintiff, the court
noted "that Karseal was within the target area of the illegal practices of Richfield; that
Karseal was not only hit, but was aimed at by Richfield." Id. at 365. This test has been used
primarily in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073,
1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 211-12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). For a detailed
discussion of the foreseeable target area test, see Alioto & Donnici, supra note 2, at 212-13;
PrivateAntitrust Litigation, supra, at 549; Sherman, supra note 5, at 384-87.
Despite the extensive exploration of these standing tests in the federal courts, they
remain somewhat ambiguous and difficult to apply, particularly in cases where illegal pricefixing activities have been the source of the injury. One commentator has stated that these
tests are really nothing more than conclusory labels. McGuire, supra note 18, at 178; see
Handler, Innovations, supra, at 27; Ultimate-Consumer Standing, supra note 2, at 403;
PrivateAntitrust Litigation,supra, at 534. Another commentator has described the problem
of standing to sue under § 4 as a "body of case law in search of a principle." Handler,
Innovations, supra, at 27.
It must be noted that the "direct injury" and "target area" concepts were developed
almost exclusively in conjunction with cases involving conspiracies to eliminate competitors.
In such cases, the court typically was called upon to determine whether a party who was
indirectly injured, such as a stockholder, employee or landlord of the affected business entity,
could maintain a civil action against the wrongdoer. See, e.g., Dailey v. Quality School Plan,
Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff whose employer was injured by antitrust violation
permitted to sue wrongdoer); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910) (stockholder not permitted to sue for injury to corporation in which he owns an interest); Harrison
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affl'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954) (owner-lessor of movie theater not permitted to sue lessee's
competitor for antitrust violations that indirectly reduced his rental income). While such
situations may lend themselves to a "target area" or "direct injury" approach, these formulae
have had little practical utility for analyzing the problems that price-fixing cases present.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted any one of the standing tests. In Perkins
v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 649-50 (1969), however, the Court appears to have implicitly approved the target area test. See vON KALINoWsKI, supra note 2, § 115.02[4]; Alioto &
Donnici, supra note 2, at 211; Beane, supra note 2, at 339-40.
21 See VON KALiNowsI, supra note 2, § 109.03[1]; Beane, supra note 2, at 347.
2 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp, 392 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1968);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918); Note, The Effect
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tion patterns, however, it is often difficult to discern exactly who in
the chain of distribution actually absorbed the overcharge and, consequently, suffered a legally cognizable injury within the meaning
of section 4.6
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,27 this problem had been addressed in a somewhat inconsistent fashion. 8 The Hanover Shoe
of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-onDoctrine, 46 So. CAL. L. Rlv. 98,
106 (1972).
Although the civil antitrust action is a creature of statute, its substantive characteristics are derived largely from a body of antitrust decisional law. Since the antitrust laws are
broad statements of congressional policy rather than carefully detailed codifications, it has
been necessary for the federal courts to develop an adequate conceptual framework for vindicating the rights that are established by the statutes. In analyzing the difficult problem of
which parties can maintain a cause of action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the federal
courts have drawn heavily upon the well-established body of common law in the field of tort
claims. Tort concepts such as "foreseeability" and "proximate cause" are often found in
judicial discussions of the problem. See note 23 supra. The analogy to tort law, however, may
be somewhat misleading. In a typical tort case, injury, duty, proximity, and zone of foreseeable harm are all factually and legally distinct concepts which can be analyzed without
reference to each other, whereas in antitrust cases, these elements are so conceptually and
factually interrelated as to be analytically inseparable. For example, an economic reversal
that is too remote from the wrongful act to support a treble damage action cannot really be
considered an injury within the meaning of § 4, since it probably resulted from independent
market reversals. Additionally, in a typical tort case, the concept of the defendant's duty can
be readily identified and defined in relation to a particular class of potentially injured parties.
See, e.g., Palsgraaf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). The provisions of
section 4 of the Clayton Act, however, supply no equivalent concept of the defendant's legal
duty with respect to his activities in the marketplace. Under the statute, the defendant has
a duty to refrain from certain anticompetitive practices, but the statute provides no clues as
to whom this duty is owed. Thus, in order to determine whether a particular plaintiff may
maintain an action against an antitrust defendant, the courts must rely solely on the analytical concepts of injury and causation. It is therefore not surprising that some courts have
resorted to the concept of legal standing to supplement their arsenal of analytical tools. See
Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 691, 699-700 (1963). See also City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co.,
53 F.R.D. 620, 629 (D. Colo. 1971) (in price-fixing cases, fact and amount of damages are
not conceptually separable); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914,
933 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (impact of violation and resultant damages in price-fixing case are coextensive concepts).
392 U.S. 481 (1968).
The federal courts generally were receptive to the argument that the purchaser who
actually absorbed the overcharge should be considered the legally injured party under the
statute. Thus, in the oft-cited Oil obber Cases, Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v.
Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Clark Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 56 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1944), affl'd, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.
Wisc.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942), the defendants were able to resist
successfully the claims of plaintiffs who had passed on the illegal overcharges to their customers. See also Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford
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Court resolved the issue definitively by holding that the fact that
the plaintiff had passed on an illegal overcharge would no longer be
accepted as a defense in a civil antitrust suit.2' In denying the defendant the right to show that the plaintiff's customers were the parties
who actually suffered injury, the Court employed two lines of reasoning. First, the Court noted that if the defendant were to successfully assert a passing-on defense, he might escape liability entirely."
In the Court's view, it was unlikely that the many ultimate purchasers who had actually absorbed the overcharge in countless minor
sales would pursue their relatively small individual claims against
the wrongdoer. Therefore, the Court concluded, permitting a defendant to raise the passing-on defense would dilute the effectiveness
of the civil action as a method of divesting wrongdoers of their illgotten profit.3 1 Such a result, according to the Court, would be incompatible with the national policy of using the civil treble damage
action as a weapon for enforcing the antitrust laws. 2
Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 432
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173
F.2d 49, 50-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949); Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v.
H. Harris & Co., 160 F. Supp. 95, 102 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 260 F.2d 958 (1st Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
In the well-noted Electrical Cases, however, the passing-on defense was rejected. See
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964); Ohio
Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Atlantic City Elec.
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied per curiam, 337 F.2d
844 (2d Cir. 1964); TmBERLAKE, supra note 15, § 20.05; Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages
and the Passing-onDefense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL. 1183, 1191-96
(1968). See also Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396
(1906); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768, 771 (N.D.
Ill. 1961).
" 392 U.S. at 488-94. The defendants in Hanover Shoe had been leasing shoe-making
machinery to the plaintiff and other shoe manufacturers. In a prior action initiated by the
federal government, the defendant's control of the relevant market, coupled with its refusal
to sell rather than lease its equipment, had been found to be a violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). This finding constituted
prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation for purposes of the subsequent civil suit brought
by Hanover Shoe, Inc. under section 4 of the Clayton Act. See note 43 infra. In an attempt
to avoid civil liability, the defendant argued that the plaintiff should not be permitted to
recover because he had passed on the overcharge to his customers and thereby avoided actual
economic injury. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. 392 U.S. at 488.
392 U.S. at 494.
' The Hanover Shoe Court stated:
[U]ltimate consumers . . . would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little
interest in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality
because no one was available who would bring suit against them.
Id.
22 Id.
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Additionally, the Hanover Shoe Court considered the pragmatic problem of tracing an overcharge through the distribution
chain and weighing the impact of the independent intervening variables. " Such an inquiry, according to the Court, would turn the
already cumbersome and costly field of civil antitrust litigation into
a judicial nightmare.Y Opting for simplicity, the Supreme Court
held that, as a matter of law, a direct purchaser who had paid an
illegal overcharge was an injured person within the meaning of the
Clayton Act.3 This direct purchaser would be entitled to recover
treble damages, even though the overcharge had been passed on to
his customers."
THE OFFENSIVE PASSING-ON THEORY AFTER

Hanover Shoe: Illinois

Brick
Although Hanover Shoe effectively eliminated defensive use of
the passing-on theory, it did not address the corollary question
whether an indirect purchaser could use offensive passing-on as a
method of proving injury. The authorities were split on the question.
Those who believed that Hanover Shoe did not preclude offensive
use of the theory tended to emphasize the policy considerations
3 The Hanover Shoe Court expressed its concern for the pragmatic proof problems
involved in permitting the use of the passing-on defense as follows:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the impact
of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact;
indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been different
(a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant, or the
labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally
difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than the economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have on its total
sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his prices in response to, and
in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had
not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of
demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his
prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge
been discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense
would require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable. On the other hand, it is not
unlikely that if the existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants will frequently seek to establish its applicability. Treble-damage actions
would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive
evidence and complicated theories.
Id. at 492-93 (footnotes omitted).
3 See id. at 493; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 740-41 (1977).
31 392 U.S. at 494.
3 Id. at 489.
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supporting the decision. 7 In Hanover Shoe, the Court was concerned with the possibility that the defendant would escape liability
entirely if it were permitted to raise the passing-on defense. Such a
concern, it was argued, is inapplicable to situations in which the
plaintiff is using the theory to support an independent right of recovery.38 Others, however, who interpreted Hanover Shoe as eliminating offensive use of the passing-on theory, focused primarily
upon the practical concerns expressed in the Court's opinion.39 Reflecting this view, one court stated that the difficulties of proving
the fact and extent of an overcharge would be as insuperable for a
plaintiff as they were for the defendant in Hanover Shoe." This
See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 405 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 597-98 (N.D. Ill. 1973); McGuire, supra
note 18, at 194-97; Ultimate-ConsumerStanding, supra note 2, at 409-10; Note, The Effect
of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-onDoctrine, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 98
(1972); Standing to Sue, supra note 3, at 988. Many courts simply assumed that Hanover
Shoe did not preclude the offensive use of passing-on theory. See, e.g., Leeward Petroleum,
Ltd. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1976); In re Master Key Antitrust
Litigation, 70 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn. 1976); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Co., 395 F.
Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
m See note 37 supra. See generally Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 884; Note, The Effect of
Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-onDoctrine, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 98, 112
(1972); Standing to Sue, supra note 3, at 992-93.
1, Some courts assumed that the rationale in Hanover Shoe required a rejection of the
offensive use of the passing-on theory. See Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Stem v. Lucy
Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C.
1973); Bill Minielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.
Ohio 1973); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Travis v. Fairmount Foods Co., 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Balmac, Inc. v. American
Metal Prods. Corp., [1972 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 74,235 (N.D. Cal.
1972); City of Akron v. Laub Baking Co., [1972 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
73,930 (N.D. Ohio 1972); City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D.
Colo. 1971); United Egg Producers, Inc. v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). See also City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo.
1971); VON KAIuNOWSIu, supra note 2, § 109.03[2]; Beane, supra note 2, at 345; Handler,
Innovations, supra note 23, at 7; Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 643; Comment, In
the Face of Uncertainty-ThePassing-On Concept in Civil Antitrust Litigation, 27 ARK. L.
Rnv. 83, 115-17 (1973); Utimate-Consumer Standing,supra note 2, at 409; Standing to Sue,
supra note 3, at 988.
40 Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D.
13, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). Among the plaintiffs in Philadelphia Housing
Auth. were new home buyers and resale purchasers who alleged that the prices of their homes
had been artificially inflated as a result of a conspiracy on the part of the defendants to fix
the prices of certain plumbing fixtures. The fixtures in question had passed through at least
three intermediary levels of distribution: wholesalers, plumbing contractors, and home build-
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court justified its avoidance of the policy question by stating that
the Hanover Shoe decision had "laid little stress on this consideration.""
The Illinois Brick Decision
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court resolved the uncertainty
surrounding the offensive passing-on question by holding that indirect purchasers who had absorbed an illegal overcharge could not
recover from the wrongdoer.4 2 The Illinois Brick defendants were
concrete block manufacturers who allegedly had engaged in a pricefixing conspiracy43 in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act."
ers. Because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate in their responses to the interrogatories
that they had dealt directly with the defendant, the district court dismissed their complaint.
50 F.R.D. at 15, 19. Under the circumstances in the case, the court was clearly justified in
ruling that the relationship between the price the plaintiffs had paid for their homes and the
initial illegal overcharge was too remote to support a cause of action under section 4 of the
Clayton Act.
It is submitted, however, that the facts in PhiladelphiaHousingAuthority represent an
extreme case. The intervening market variables were not only numerous, but were highly
independent and unpredictable as well. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191, 198 n.6 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). Other situations in which the
intervening market variables are less numerous and thus more predictable might be better
suited to the offensive passing-on analysis. For example, one commentator has noted that the
offensive passing-on theory should be applicable to a situation in which a building supply
manufacturer illegally overcharges its wholesale customer, and the wholesale customer in
turn passes the overcharge on to municipal consumers. Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages
and the Passing-on Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANrusT BULL. 1183, 1217
(1968). In this case, according to the author, the effect of the intervening market factors is
likely to be minimized. Ironically, this hypothetical situation is almost identical to the facts
presented in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), in which the Supreme Court
flatly rejected the offensive use of the passing-on theory. See note 57 infra.
4" 50 F.R.D. at 29-30.
42

431 U.S. at 728.

a Prior to the initiation of the civil treble damage action, the federal government had
filed a criminal complaint charging the defendants and other cement block manufacturers
with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. The defendants entered a plea of nolo contendere
and the matter was resolved by consent decree. See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d
1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976), a final judgment or decree against a
defendant in an antitrust action initiated by the federal government under the antitrust laws
becomes prima facie evidence of a violation in any subsequent civil action for damages. The
purpose of this provision is to encourage private litigants to bring actions under section 4 of
the Clayton Act and to minimize the burden of proof for such litigants. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965); Emich Motors Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951). Where the action brought by the Justice
Department is resolved by a plea of nolo contendere or the entering of a consent decree,
however, the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) are not available as an aid to private plaintiffs.
See City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
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Their products had been sold first to masonry contractors and then
to general contractors. 5 The general contractors, in turn, had used
the cement blocks in the construction of buildings which were purchased by the plaintiffs."6 In their action for damages against the
concrete block manufacturers, the plaintiffs claimed that they had
absorbed the illegal overcharge in the purchase price for the buildings and therefore had suffered economic injury. 7
Justice White, writing for the majority,"8 rejected this claim and
held that the rationale of the Hanover Shoe rule was dispositive of
the offensive passing-on question. 9 According to Justice White, the
conceptual and practical difficulties of proof that disturbed the
Hanover Shoe Court were of equal concern in the offensive passingon situation. 5 Moreover, the policy considerations that had influenced the Court's earlier ruling would not, in Justice White's view,
be served by opening the federal courts to the myriad claims of
small, indirect purchasers who could conceivably be injured by illegal pricing.5' An additional consideration raised by the IllinoisBrick
939 (1964); Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd sub nom.
Data Processing Financial & Gen. Corp. v. IBM, 430 F. 2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970); United States
v. American Bakeries Co., 284 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Dalweld Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Thus, had the civil case proceeded to a trial
on the merits, the plaintiffs in Illinois Brick would have had to bear the full burden of proving
that the defendants had violated the antitrust laws.
" 431 U.S. at 727. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal."
431 U.S. at 726.

Id. at 726-27. The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick were 700 government entities. Id. at 727
n.6. All other claimants, including masonry contractors, general contractors, and private
builders, had settled their respective claims against the defendant before trial. Illinois v.
Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
0 431 U.S. at 727. The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick alleged that they had paid an additional
$3 million for the concrete block sold by the defendant. The additional expense was allegedly
the result of the defendant's illegal price-fixing practices. Id. In one of the many construction
jobs involved in the transaction at issue, the concrete block represented 3.9% of the cost of
the masonry contract and .49% of the total cost of the project. Petitioner's Reply Brief in
Support of the Grant of a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).
I Joining Justice White in this 6-3 decision were Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart. Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall dissented.
"431 U.S. at 728.
0 Id. at 730-33.
11In Justice White's view,
the longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust
"

laws

. . .

supports

. . .

adherence to the Hanover Shoe rule, under which direct
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Court was the risk of multiple liability created by Hanover Shoe,
which held the defendant automatically liable to the direct purchaser. 52 If the subsequent purchasers were also permitted to sue,
the defendant could be subjected to at least two levels of civil liability. In view of the treble damage provision in the Clayton Act, the
Court was unwilling to expose antitrust defendants to such an onerous risk.
Although the Supreme Court found the Hanover Shoe rationale
dispositive of the questions presented in Illinois Brick,53 it acknowledged that there might be grounds for distinguishing the two cases.
The price-fixed product in Hanover Shoe was machinery, a capital
item that would not itself be resold to the direct purchaser's customers." Only by adding the illegal overcharge into its general overhead
costs and then allocating this amount to its consumer products
could the direct purchaser pass on the overcharge to its customers.
purchasers are not only spared the burden of litigating the intricacies of pass-on
but are also permitted to recover the full amount of the overcharge. . . . [O]n
balance. . . . we conclude that the legislative purpose in creating a group of
"private attorneys general" to enforce the antitrust laws under § 4 . . . is better
served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge
paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may
have absorbed a part of it.
. . . In view of the considerations supporting the Hanover Shoe rule, we are
unwilling to carry the compensation principle to its logical extreme by attempting
to allocate damages among all "those within the defendant's chain of distribution,"
. . . especially because we question the extent to which such an attempt would
make individual victims whole for actual injuries suffered rather than simply depleting the overall recovery in litigation over pass-on issues. Many of the indirect
purchasers barred from asserting pass-on claims under the Hanover Shoe rule have
such a small stake in the lawsuit that even if they were to recover as part of a claim
only a small fraction would be likely to come forward to collect their damages.
Id. at 745-47 (citations and footnotes omitted); see Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and
the Passing-onDefense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTrrRUST BULL. 1183, 1215 (1968).
The IllinoisBrick Court's reasoning , however, was not well supported by the facts in the case.
The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick, a variety of municipal entities, were actually large scale
consumers with a substantial stake in the litigation and a strong incentive to come forward
and assert their respective claims. The fact that 48 states participated in an amicus curiae
brief urging the Court to uphold Illinois' claim is a further indication of the substantial
financial interests that may be involved in indirect purchaser claims. Significantly, the
Court's reasoning in this section of the opinion appears to overlook the impact that the
recently enacted Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15c-15h (West Supp. 1978), can be
expected to have on claims of this nature. Under the provisions of this statute, the small
claims of many individual indirect purchasers may be aggregated and pursued by the state
attorney general acting in parenspatriae.See note 96 infra. This aggregation of small claims
could have eliminated many of the allocation problems that the Illinois Brick Court identified.
52 431 U.S. at 730-31.
3 Id. at 728 n.7.
392 U.S. at 483-84.
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In Illinois Brick, however, the relationship between the remote purchaser and the initial overcharge was more direct. The product in
question was not a capital item, but was rather a component part
of the buildings that had been purchased by the plaintiffs. The
middlemen in the case, the contractors, could have simply added
the overcharge to their materials cost and included it in their price
to the ultimate consumer, the plaintiffs.5 Despite this important
dissimilarity, however, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to distinguish the two cases and thereby narrow the scope of Hanover
Shoe.5" Having thus rejected the possibility of distinguishing the
case before it from Hanover Shoe,57 the Illinois Brick Court was
" See ALI-ABA Seminar, in Miami, Fla. (Feb. 17-18, 1978) (remarks of Judge Real),
discussed in [1978] ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 852, at A-5 (Feb. 23, 1978).
" 431 U.S. at 744. Prior to the ruling in Illinois Brick, some federal courts analyzed
passing-on questions by examining the relationship between the direct purchaser and the
price-fixed product. If the direct purchaser "consumed" the price-fixed product or used it
to produce a second product, he was permitted to recover treble damages from the wrongdoer, even if he actually had passed on the illegal overcharge to his customers. See, e.g.,
Standard Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
829 (1974); Electrical Cases, supra note 28; Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction
Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962). In Bill Minielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1973), the court used
similar reasoning to deny the claim of an indirect purchaser who had absorbed a passed-on
overcharge.
If, on the other hand, the direct purchaser had acted as a middleman, selling the product
to his customers in a substantially unchanged state, the customers were permitted to recover
from the wrongdoer if they had actually absorbed the overcharge. See, e.g., In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974);
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418-19 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 597 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); cf. Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973) (passing-on defense
permitted where the plaintiff-direct purchaser was deemed to be a middleman). But see
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (mere
change in the form of product is not determinative); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1964) (middleman-consumer distinction
rejected). Cf. Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 642 (the middleman-consumer distinction is not helpful because it fails to address the problem of independent intervening market
variables). For a discussion of the use of the middleman-consumer distinction, see Pollock,
Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-on Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13
ANTITRUST BuLL. 1183, 1192 (1968).
"' The Illinois Brick Court also refused to consider the possibility of broadening the only
exception to the general rule of Hanover Shoe, the cost-plus exception. Under Hanover Shoe,
the generally impermissible passing-on defense is allowed if the defendant can establish that
the direct purchaser-plaintiff's price to his customers was based on the actual cost of materials plus a prearranged fixed mark-up. 392 U.S. at 494. In such marketing arrangements, the
pass-on is actually built into the contract and is therefore easily identified and traced.
For several years after the Hanover Shoe decision, there was some uncertainty concerning
the scope of this exception. In in re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), the court concluded that "[t]he [Hanover
Shoe] Court thus left open for future decision cases in which the passing on of the illegal
overcharge might be more readily demonstrable." See Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages
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and the Passing-on Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL. 1183, 1188
(1968). Several commentators had suggested that the cost-plus exception mentioned in
Hanover Shoe could be interpreted broadly to permit the offensive use of the passing-on
theory in a wide variety of situations. See Beane, supra note 2, at 351-52; Pollock, supra, at
1212; Ultimate-ConsumerStanding,supra note 2, at 411-13. In West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), the court extended
the Hanover Shoe cost-plus exception to a marketing system in which the direct purchaser
added a fixed percentage mark-up to its cost before passing on the product to its customers.
A similar marketing system was employed by the contractors and subcontractors who acted
as middlemen in Illinois Brick. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Grant of a Writ of
Certiorari at 8-9, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The Illinois Brick Court,
however, refused to find this arrangement to be a cost-plus system within the meaning of the
exception carved out by the Hanover Shoe Court. 431 U.S. at 735. Writing for the majority,
Justice White noted that "[t]he competitive bidding process by which the concrete block
involved in this case was incorporated into masonry structures and then into entire buildings
can hardly be said to circumvent complex market interactions as would a cost-plus contract."
Id. at 736.
Unfortunately, this observation overlooks some significant peculiarities in the public
construction industry, which is in some measure insulated from ordinary market influences.
First, the contractors in this industry generally calculate their bids by adding a fixed percentage mark-up to the cost of materials. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Grant
of a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9; Brief of State of California Through Its Attorney General, Evelle
J. Younger Amicus Curiae, at 15. Second, in this industry, the contractor does not ordinarily
acquire the necessary materials until after it has been awarded the contract. It generally takes
the anticipatory bids of subcontractors and suppliers, including any illegal overcharges that
have been added to their prices, and calculates its total bid accordingly. See id. If the Illinois
Brick Court had given greater consideration to these facts, it might have concluded that the
intermediary contractors in this situation are often mere conduits for the illegal overcharge.
Rather than adopting an expansive view and permitting a more extensive factual inquiry, the
Court chose to narrowly define the cost-plus exception to pre-arranged contracts in which
"[the direct purchaser's] customer is committed to buying a fixed quantity regardless of
price." 431 U.S. at 736.
It should be noted that, although it explicitly narrowed the cost-plus exception defined
in Hanover Shoe, the Illinois Brick Court indicated that it might be willing to recognize an
additional exception in cases in which "the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its
customer." 431 U.S. at 736 n.16 (citing Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969),
and In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974)). Western Liquid Asphalt, however, presented a situation in which the
direct purchaser was controlled not by its customer, the plaintiff, but rather by its supplier,
the defendant. 487 F.2d at 198-99. Similarly, in Perkins, which involved a violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
extended unlawfully favorable treatment to a wholesaler who passed on the advantageous
price to his subsidiary, the plaintiffs competitor. 395 U.S. at 647-48.
This discrepancy in the Illinois Brick opinion creates a question concerning the scope of
the additional exception prescribed by the Court. It is suggested that this exception should
be applied in situations such as that presented in Western Liquid Asphalt, in which the
defendant controlled the intermediary. Although the Illinois Brick Court did not explicitly
mention this type of situation, it is fair to assume that such an interpretation was intended.
Any other interpretation could lead to the anomalous conclusion that antitrust violators could
avoid all civil liability under § 4 by simply establishing sham corporations and using them
as distributors for price-fixed products. Cf. Ultimate-ConsumerStanding, supra note 2, at
412-13 (offensive passing-on theory should be permitted where manufacturer controls or
influences retail prices through use of suggested list prices).
In Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp, [1978] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 61,934 (3d Cir. 1978),
the Third Circuit recognized an analogous exception and permitted a § 4 suit by a plaintiff
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confronted with the choice of either overruling the earlier decision
or extending it to the offensive passing-on situation." Its decision
to adopt the latter approach was, in part, a result of a determination
to adhere to the principle of stare decisis." A more compelling reason for not overruling the Hanover Shoe decision, however, was the
Illinois Brick Court's fear that "[p]ermitting the use- of pass-on
theories under § 4

. .

.would add whole new dimensions of com-

plexity to treble-damage suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness."" Specifically, the Court was concerned with the troublesome complications that may arise in proving the fact and extent
of the plaintiff's injury and the difficulty of fashioning a method to
eliminate the threat of multiple liability in private antitrust suits.
The Problem of Proving Injury
Both Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe reflect the Supreme
Court's belief that if the passing-on theory were to be used in civil
antitrust suits, such litigation would become hopelessly complicated and fraught with uncertainty."' In light of the difficulties involved in tracing the impact of an illegal overcharge through the
who had not bought the price-fixed product from the defendant, but had bought items
containing the price-fixed product from both the defendant and the defendant's subsidiary.
In holding that the Illinois Brick decision did not bar this plaintiff, the court stated that "to
deny recovery in this instance. . . would allow the price-fixer of a basic commodity to escape
the reach of a treble-damage penalty simply by incorporating the tainted element into another product." Id. at 73,953. Similarly, in Gas-A-Tron v. American Oil Co., [1977 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,789 (D. Ariz. 1977), the court stated that Illinois Brick
did not preclude a suit by a plaintiff who purchased from an intermediary where the latter
was not the price-fixer, but was a participant in the illegal combination.
m 431 U.S. at 736.

39Id. The Illinois Brick Court's determination to adhere to the principle of stare decisis
is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that only two weeks later, in Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court did in fact overrule a prior
antitrust decision and, in the process, swept away a decade of established precedent. The
plaintiff in ContinentalT. V. alleged that the defendant had violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), by enforcing franchise agreements that limited the sale of defendant's products to certain specified locations. 433 U.S. at 40. In United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Supreme Court had held that such a practice was a
per se violation of the antitrust laws. Citing Illinois Brick as an illustration of the principle
of stare decisis, 433 U.S. at 47, the ContinentalT.V. Court ignored that principle and, without
further discussion, explicitly overruled Schwinn. Id. at 58. Justice White, who wrote the
majority opinion in Illinois Brick, however, offered a concurring opinion in Continental T. V.
in which he argued that the stare decisis rule should control. Although Justice White would
have reached the same result as was reached by the ContinentalT. V. majority, he would have
done so by distinguishing rather than overruling the prior case. Id. at 59-71 (White, J.,
concurring).
431 U.S. at 737.
" Id. at 731-33; 392 U.S. at 494.
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various levels of the distribution chain, this concern is clearly a
substantial one. There are, however, some indications that the
Court overstated the importance of these difficulties, particularly in
situations which involve offensive use of passing-on.
Traditional economic theories exist to aid courts in measuring
the economic consequences of an overcharge. If, for example, the
market for the product in question is highly inelastic, intermediaries
in the distribution chain are likely to encounter little difficulty in
passing on the overcharge to their customers. If, on the other hand,
the market is a highly elastic one where increased prices result in
diminished demand, the direct purchaser probably will be forced to
absorb the overcharge.2 In addition, if, as in Illinois Brick, the
price-fixed product is a relatively small, inexpensive component in
a larger unit, the overcharge is more likely to be absorbed at the
farther reaches of the distribution chain. 3 Such factors and theoretical constructs are available to assist the courts in determining with
some certainty whether an overcharge has been passed on. 4 In declining to rely on these theories as a basis for making such a determiSee Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 887-900.
6 In situations in which the price-fixed product is a relatively small component in a
larger finished unit, the demand for the product probably will not be significantly affected
by an increase in the component's price. One commentator has observed that such a market
situation may provide a fertile environment for illegal price-fixing activities. Id. at 900.
However, some commentators have observed that, in such situations, it is extremely difficult
to prove that an increase in the price of the finished unit was the direct result of an illegal
overcharge for the component product rather than a result of independent market factors.
See, e.g., Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 638-49. Such difficulties of proof may have
influenced the court in PhiladelphiaHous. Auth. v. American Radiator& Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), wherein the court was called upon to
determine whether the purchasers of new and used homes could recover treble damages from
certain plumbing fixture manufacturers who had illegally increased the price of their products
by $10 to $20 per unit. In denying the claims of the plaintiffs, the PhiladelphiaHous. Auth.
court concluded that it was unlikely that this small overcharge for a relatively minor component had produced an equivalent increase in the price of the houses. Id. at 26.
6, Many commentators have argued that the Hanover Shoe Court exaggerated the difficulties involved in proving the fact and amount of a passed-on overcharge. See, e.g., McGuire,
supra note 18, at 185; Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-onDefense: The
Hanover Shoe Rule, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1209-13 (1968); Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 91529; Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-on Doctrine, 46
So. CAL.L. REV. 98, 113 (1972); Standing to Sue, supranote 3, at 983; LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
No. 7, supra note 17, at 11 (quoting Thomas Kauper, Ass't Atty. Gen. in charge of the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Dep't). But see Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 643,
654 (statistical analysis and hypothetical economic models are of limited utility in tracing
the effect of illegal overcharges). For a discussion of modem techniques available for analyzing the economic problems that arise in antitrust suits, see Lanzillotti, Problems of Proof of
Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL.329 (1971); Guilfoil, Damage Determination
in Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (1967).
6
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nation, the Illinois Brick Court observed that economic analyses
based upon theoretical models and constructs are not capable of
yielding mathematically certain results 5 The absence of absolute
certainty in the results obtained through use of economic theories,
however, does not negate their value in complex civil antitrust actions." The testimony of economists as expert witnesses, for example, is commonly used in antitrust suits to establish the factual
basis for a claim."7
In its concern for certainty, the Illinois Brick Court appears to
have overlooked the important distinction between proving the fact
of injury and proving the amount of damages." Although the level
The Illinois Brick Court noted:
Under an array of simplifying assumptions, economic theory provides a precise
formula for calculating how the overcharge is distributed between the overcharged
party (passer) and its customers (passees). If the market for the passer's product
is perfectly competitive; if the overcharge is imposed equally on all of the passer's
competitors; and if the passer maximizes its profits, then the ratio of the shares of
the overcharge borne by the passee and the passer will equal the ratio of the
elasticities of supply and demand in the market for the passer's products. Even if
these assumptions are accepted, there remains a serious problem of measuring the
relevant elasticities-the percentage change in the quantities of the passer's product demanded and supplied in response to a one percent change in price. In view
of the difficulties that have been encountered . . . with the statistical techniques
used to estimate these concepts, . . . it is unrealistic to think that elasticity studies
. . .will resolve the pass-on issue.
431 U.S. at 741-42 (footnotes and citations ommitted) (emphasis in original).
" Despite the concerns expressed by the Illinois Brick Court, see note 65 supra, the
federal courts have been able, in certain contexts, to ascertain the fact and amount of damages resulting from a passed-on illegal overcharge. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Carnivale Bag Co. v.
Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. 111.1973). In fact, after hearing the facts in Illinois Brick, the Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit, apparently believed that the fact and amount of damages could
be proven with sufficient certainty to warrant a trial on the merits. See Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977).
" See, e.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206
F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); voN
KAuNowsvI, supra note 2, § 110.01[1]. The same analytical techniques often are used by
industrial planners in making their pricing decisions. In In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court observed that the "[m]ost important
management decisions in the business world in which these defendants operate are made
through the intelligent application of statistical and computer techniques and these class
members should be entitled to use the same techniques in proving the elements of their cause
of action."
0 See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931). But cf. Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(questions of injury and damages too interrelated to be addressed in bifurcated trial); Pollock,
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of proof required to establish the former is generally higher, 9 the
Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff suing for treble damages
need show only a "causal connection between the. . . violation...
and the injury suffered."" ° The same Court also noted that "[i]f
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support an inference of
causation, the ultimate conclusion as to what that evidence proves
is for the jury."" It would appear that the theoretical economic
models combined with other factual material could be enough in a
given case to prove that an indirect purchaser had, in fact, been
injured by a passed-on overcharge. The precise extent of the passon and the exact amount of the damages are not relevant in this
72
context.
Furthermore, the position of an indirect purchaser attempting
to prove a passed-on economic injury should be distinguished from
that of a defendant seeking to utilize passing-on as a means of
avoiding liability.73 In the defensive passing-on situation, the defenThe "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L.
REv. 691, 695-96 (1963) (since issues of fact and amount of damages are closely intertwined,

they should not be given separate treatment).
" VON KAUNowsKI, supra note 2, § 115.02[2]; see, e.g., Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T.
Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Loew's, Inc. v.
Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
,"Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); see Response of Carolina, Inc.
v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Zenith Vinyl Fabrics Corp. v. Ford
Motor Co., 357 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Mich. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
"1395 U.S. at 648 (citation omitted).
12In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969), the Court
noted that "damage issues in these [antitrust] cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of
concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts." It is probably for this
reason that the courts generally have not required plaintiffs seeking treble damages under
§ 4 to be able to prove the amount of damages with precision. As long as the amount of
damages can be reasonably ascertained, the courts have been willing to permit recovery. In
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931), the Supreme Court observed:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of
the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the
wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 509 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 833 (1975); Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963),
rev'd on othergrounds, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); National Wrestling Alliance v. Myers, 325 F.2d
768 (8th Cir. 1963). Of course, neither the fact nor the amount of damages can be wholly
speculative. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 115.02[2].
,"See McGuire, supra note 18, at 193 (defensive use of passing-on theory presents more
difficult proof problems than does offensive use of theory); Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 884
(although economic analysis for offensive and defensive passing-on is the same, nature of
what has to be proven is different); Standing to Sue, supra note 3, at 990-92 (defensive and
offensive passing-on require different levels of proof).
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dant must prove that no part of the illegal overcharge was absorbed
by the plaintiff-direct purchaser. As the Hanover Shoe Court observed, the constructs and hypothetical models of economists probably are not precise enough to establish complete absence of injury on the part of the plaintiff.74 In fact, even when these economists' tools are coupled with substantial factual information, the
defendant's burden of proof on this issue indeed could be "insurmountable." The plaintiff seeking to establish injury and a right
to sue under the language of the Clayton Act, however, should
only be required to show that he absorbed some part of the overcharge. 5 The precise percentage of the overcharge absorbed by the
plaintiff becomes important only in the context of the secondary
problem of allocating the total recovery among competing injured
claimants. While this allocation process could introduce some additional complications, it should not in itself be a critical factor in the
determination of substantive rights. 6
The Multiple Liability Problem
The multiple liability problem, which was emphasized in
Illinois Brick,77 presents one of the strongest arguments against permitting use of the passing-on theory as an offensive weapon.78 Many
7,392

U.S. at 492-93.

15Many of the cases construing § 4 have held that the plaintiff need only show that his
injury was proximately caused by the defendant's illegal conduct. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 934 (1966); E.V. Prentice Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, Inc., 252 F.2d 473,
477 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); Momand v. Universal Films Exchs., Inc.,
172 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F.
Supp. 544, 547 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 310 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1962).
11In In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974), the court emphatically stated that "[tihe day is long past when courts,
particularly federal courts, will deny relief to a deserving plaintiff merely because of procedural difficulties or problems of apportioning damages." See South Carolina Council of Milk
Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 420 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966);
Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also
Handler, Innovations, supra note 23, at 30-37.
17431 U.S. at 737-41.
78 The knotty multiple liability problem has been noted by many courts and commentators. See, e.g., Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D.
13, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); Beane, supra note 2, at 348; Handler & Blechman, supranote 6, at 649; Ultimate-ConsumerStanding,supra note 2, at 410. But see Boshes
v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Dl. 1973), in which the court stated that
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procedural devices exist, however, that reduce the likelihood of multiple liability to a remote possibility. If, for example, all or most of
the injured parties have initiated independent lawsuits, the use of
interdistrict transfers" and consolidation of multidistrict litigation"0
would help to avoid conflicting and overlapping judgments. A defendant who anticipates a multiple liability problem can use statutory interpleader 81 to bring a substantial number of the potential
claimants into the litigation.82 An alternative method for bringing
the potential claimants into court would be to invoke the compulsory joinder provisions of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 In addition to these procedural devices, the 4-year statute of
limitations which governs civil cases arising under section 4 provides a safeguard against multiple liability. 4 In light of the protracted nature of antitrust litigation, this relatively short period for
commencing an action significantly diminishes the danger that a
defendant who pays a judgment8 5 will be exposed to liability in a
"cutting off the rights of such a substantial number of potentially injured persons merely
because such a 'possibility' exists is far too drastic a measure to take." See also Schaeffer,
supra note 2, at 923-33 (threat of multiple liability may be consistent with punitive purposes
of statute).
79 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
0 Id. § 1407. The concept of multidistrict coordination developed as a result of the
experience of the federal courts in the Electrical Cases, cited in note 28 supra.For a discussion
of the effectiveness of this device, see Handler, Innovations, supra note 23, at 15-17.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
Despite the apparent benefits of statutory interpleader, the defendant in a complex
antitrust action might find the procedural requirements extremely onerous. In order to invoke
the interpleader provisions, the defendant would be conceding in effect that it had violated
the antitrust laws and that it was liable for the claimed amount of damages. Id. § 1335(a)(1).
Under the statute, the court could require the defendant to post a substantial bond as a
condition precedent to the defendant's use of interpleader. Id. § 1335(a)(2). In large treble
damage actions, such a requirement could render this procedural device financially prohibitive. Finally, if the defendant wishes to bring all of the potential claimants, including ultimate consumers, into the litigation, it will have to assume the burden of structuring a
complex subclass action in much the same manner as would the representative plaintiff
making a claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See McGuire, supra note 18, at 197; Standing to
Sue, supra note 3, at 993.
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 19; see McGuire, supra note 18, at 201-02; Standing to Sue, supra note
3, at 997-98. Joinder of all the necessary parties may be impractical, however, in cases
involving large classes of plaintiffs.
If the action is initiated by the indirect purchasers, middlemen seeking to establish their
claims could enter the litigation through the mechanisms oT intervention as of right and
permissive intervention. FED. R. Civ. P. 24. Theoretically, these mechanisms would also be
available to indirect purchasers seeking to establish a claim in an action commenced by the
direct purchaser. Such intervention is unlikely, however, if the indirect purchasers' claims
are small or if the indirect purchasers are not in a position to be aware of the existence of the
litigation.
m 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
" The risk of multiple liability to claimants who have not yet come forward may discour-
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subsequent suit.6 Furthermore, some authorities have suggested
that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata might be
helpful to a defendant seeking to avoid multiple liability.87 The
combined existence of these procedural devices and legal theories
would mean that only in rare instances would a potential claimant
escape this net of safeguards and be able to hold a defendant liable
after a final judgment has been entered and paid."8 In such a case,
it is conceivable that additional legal theories could be fashioned by
the courts to limit the defendant's total liability.89
age the defendant in passing-on cases from reaching an out-of-court settlement with the
known plaintiffs. Such a defendant may prefer to wait until the 4-year statute of limitations
has run. One commmentator has suggested that this problem might be minimized by allowing
the defendant to place the settlement fund into an escrow account to be held in trust for
future claimants who emerge before the statute of limitations has run. McGuire, supra note
18, at 199-200.
11Several authorities have cited the short statute of limitations as a helpful factor in
minimizing the multiple liability problem. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487
F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale Bag Co. v. SlideRite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
87 See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also
VON KAuNowsm, supra note 2, § 109.04[1]-[5]. The concepts of res judicata and collateral
estoppel have only limited utility in antitrust cases, however, since a claimant who was not
a party to the action generally would not be bound by a prior judgment. See 1B MooRE's
FEDERAL PRAMCICE
0.411-.412, 0.441[3], at 1251, 3781 (2d ed. 1974); Handler & Blechman,
supra note 6, at 650. Thus, only if these doctrines were modified to accommodate the special
problems of passing-on litigation would they become truly significant aids to antitrust defendants.
11One court has observed that the specter of multiple liability is "nothing more than
a hypothetical question concerning the allocation of provable injury, not. . . that of the
standing necessary to maintain a cause of action." Washington v. American Pipe & Constr.
Co., 274 F. Supp. 961, 965 (W.D. Wash. 1967). In fact, although multiple liability is theoretically possible in cases where offensive passing-on is permitted, to date no defendant has
actually had to pay duplicative damages to separate claimants. Amicus Curiae Brief for 48
States and Nat'l Assoc. of Attys. Gen. at 38; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 7,
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
11Many methods have been suggested to minimize or even eliminate the multiple liability problem in cases involving passed-on overcharges. One commentator has suggested that
a shortened 1-year statute of limitations be applied to the initiation of an action by the direct
purchaser. This approach is justified on the theory that a direct purchaser who was actually
injured by having to absorb an illegal overcharge ordinarily would not choose to delay the
commencement of legal action. Indirect purchasers who have, in many cases, less access to
information concerning competitive conditions in the wrongdoer's marketplace would continue to have 4 years to initiate their claims. Thus, the antitrust defendant would be exposed
to the possibility of multiple liability only if a direct purchaser initiated a lawsuit within a
year after the purchase occurred. The author of this proposal further suggests that, in such
situations, the court use its discretion to set low bond so that the defendant can interplead
the other potential claimants without suffering undue financial hardship. Note, The Effect
of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-on Doctrine, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 98,
116 (1972). Unfortunately, this approach has some serious weaknesses. Rather than com-
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Indirect purchasers, for example, could be precluded from suing
the wrongdoer if the latter has already paid a judgment to the direct
purchaser." In these situations, the indirect purchaser could be required instead to look to the successful direct purchaser, who would
be deemed to hold his recovery in constructive trust for those who
had absorbed the passed-on overcharge. In order to ensure the continuing availability of the recovery fund for future claimants, the
court could require the successful direct purchaser-plaintiff to place
the money in an interest bearing account until the 4-year statute of
limitations has run and special masters could be utilized91 to assist
in allocating the fund among the claimants.92
One negative aspect of the constructive trust approach is that
it could serve to discourage direct purchasers from initiating private
pletely eliminating the risk of multiple liability, it merely reduces the possibility that the
problem will arise. Additionally, this approach works to the detriment of direct purchasers
whose legal position would be enhanced if they could wait until the government had initiated
a suit against the wrongdoer. See note 43 supra. In many instances, the direct purchaser does
not become aware that he has been victimized by illegal practices until he learns that the
Justice Department has initiated an action.
See McGuire, supra note 18, at 198-201.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
" See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974). The constructive trust approach appears to be conceptually sound. The
sole theoretical problem with the concept is that it eliminates the right of the indirect purchaser to relitigate the issue of the amount of damages. Under this approach, the indirect
purchaser is effectively bound on the damage.issue by the findings of the court in the original
action between' the direct purchaser and the wrongdoer. This diminution in the indirect
purchaser's rights seems to have at least some theoretical support. The constructive trust
theory implicitly assumes that, in instances where the direct purchaser has maintained a
successful lawsuit, the indirect purchaser has no primary right against the wrongdoer. Instead, his right of action is converted into a secondary right to proceed against the party who
directly caused his injury by passing on the illegal overcharge. Under this assumption, there
should be no theoretical objection to depriving the indirect purchasers of a right to litigate
the damage issue in an adversary proceeding against the original wrongdoer.
A similar doctrine could be evolved to prevent multiple liability in situations in which
the indirect purchasers sue and recover before the direct purchaser initiates an action. The
Hanover Shoe rule, for example, might be modified to create a rebuttable presumption rather
than an absolute prohibition of the defensive use of the passing-on theory. The direct
purchaser-plaintiff would be presumed to actually have been economically injured by the
illegal conduct of the defendant. The defendant, however, would be permitted to rebut the
presumption by showing that indirect purchasers had successfully maintained a cause of
action and recovered damages from him. Such a recovery would be strong evidence of the
fact that a pass-on had occurred and that the direct purchaser-plaintiff was not actually
injured. Thus, only in those instances where the second court reached a contrary result and
found that, as a question of fact, no pass-on had occurred would the defendant face the
problem of multiple liability. See McGuire, supra note 18, at 200-01. Such an approach would
also be useful in cases where the trial court determines that the indirect purchaser absorbed
only a portion of the illegal overcharge. In this situation, the defendant could be permitted
to use this determination to reduce his liability for damages in a subsequent action brought
by the direct purchaser.
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treble damage actions. A direct purchaser, for example, might find
the prospect of having to defend his recovery fund against claims
from its customers too burdensome to warrant the massive expenditure of time and money. In addition, the requirement that the recovery fund be effectively frozen for a number of years could diminish
the incentive for direct purchasers to bring suit. It would appear,
however, that the prospect of retaining a significant portion of a
treble damage award would be sufficient to outweigh these negative
factors. Thus, it appears that the Illinois Brick Court may have
exaggerated the significance of the multiple liability problem.
THE IMPAcT OF Illinois Brick

The Supreme Court's decisions in Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick have produced a rule of law that is straightforward in application but conceptually difficult to justify. Under this rule, a party
who purchases directly from the wrongdoer has a right of recovery
whether or not he suffers actual economic injury. On the other hand,
an indirect purchaser is barred from seeking redress, even though
he may have absorbed the illegal overcharge. While it is true that
this rule protects antitrust defendants from the threat of multiple
liability, it creates the possibility of a windfall for the direct purchaser who was able to recover his economic loss in the marketplace
through increased prices. To the extent that this windfall occurs at
the expense of an indirect purchaser who is actually injured, the
compensatory purposes of the antitrust statutes have been defeated."
This result appears to be in direct conflict with the intent of
recent congressional initiatives that were designed to make civil
antitrust remedies more available to the individual consumer. For
example, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
5 on behalf
197611 permits the states to sue in parens patriae1
of
11Under the rule established in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, it is possible for the
direct purchaser to recover four times the amount of his actual loss, since he may be able to
raise his price to his customers in an amount equal to his loss and still recover treble damages
in a suit against the wrongdoer. See Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-on
Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL. 1183, 1218 (1968). The possibility

of such a windfall recovery, occurring at the expense of indirect purchasers who actually have
absorbed the illegal overcharge, appears to be inconsistent with the compensatory purpose

of § 4. See Ultimate-ConsumerStanding, supra note 2, at 409 n.93; note 15 supra.
" Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. I, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394-96 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
15c-15h (West Supp. 1978)) [hereinafter cited as Hart-Scott-Rodino Act].

11Historically, the doctrine of parens patriae was used to permit the states to sue on
behalf of incompetent citizens or to vindicate its own quasi-sovereign interest. See Hawaii v.

Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-59 (1972). The concept originated in English common
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citizens who are injured by antitrust violations.9 6 The statute was
enacted in response to the holding in California v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,"7
which denied the state a right to maintain an antitrust suit98 under
the Clayton Act on behalf of its citizens. The underlying purpose of
the new statute was to establish procedures that would facilitate the
institution of antitrust suits and render them manageable. 101 The
problem of allocating the proceeds of the lawsuit among competing
claimants was resolved by the creation of an innovative procedural
device, the fluid recovery fund.101 Under the terms of the Act, the
law and, although it was later accepted in several states, it was never widely recognized in
the federal courts. See H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1975), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2572, 2574; note 98 infra. For a discussion of the
background of the parenspatriae concept, see Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. Rav. 193, 197-99 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Malina & Blechman].
15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such
State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State, in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure
monetary relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by such natural
persons to their property by reason of any violation of [the antitrust laws] ....
v7474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
" Although government entities have been permitted to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act for damage to their own proprietary interests, see, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), they generally have been precluded from recovering
in parenspatriaefor injuries suffered by their citizens. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251 (1922); Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 633 n.39; Malina & Blechman,
supra note 95, at 197-99. See also note 95 supra. The approach generally taken by modern
courts toward the parens patriae concept was aptly expressed in In re Multidistrict Vehicle
Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), in which the
court stated: "[P]olitical subdivisions such as cities and counties, whose power is derivative
and not sovereign, cannot use as parenspatriae, although they might sue to vindicate such
of their own proprietary interests as might be congruent with the interests of their inhabitants." Although states are sovereign entities, they have been similarly precluded from maintaining actions in the absence of a proprietary interest. See note 95 supra. But see In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which the court
observed:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a better representative of the retail consumers within a
state than the state's attorney general. Historically the common law powers of the
attorney general include the right and duty to take actions necessary to the maintenance of the general welfare and his presence in these actions is but a modern day
application of that right and duty.
" H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1975), reprinted in [1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2571, 2574-75.
M H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 15 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2578, 2584-85.
,0115 U.S.C.A. § 15e (West Supp. 1978). This section of the recently enacted statute
embodies the concept of the fluid class recovery fund that was suggested by the district court
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005
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successful plaintiff-state may become the custodian of the recovery
fund."0 2 Citizens who were actually injured by the antitrust violation
would be obliged to establish their individual claims through procedures established at the state level."0 3 The state would then apply
any unclaimed amounts remaining in the fund to public welfare
projects that bear some relation to the violation." 4 In this way, funds
that are not used to compensate victims directly may be used to
fulfill a more general compensatory goal.
Another important feature of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is its
simplified requirements for notifying potential claimants. The framers of the Act sought to avoid the costly and cumbersome notice
requirements that have been imposed upon class actions.0 5 The Act
(2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The district court in Eisen explained its use of the
fluid recovery concept as follows:
Distribution of an eventual recovery to the class members . . . need not be
viewed solely in terms of personal and individual damages and recoupment thereof.
Such a view is appropriate where the disputed transactions themselves are personal
and individual and have litigable significance to the plaintiff. The situation here,
however, is different. Although the total volume of transactions is very large, each
transaction, as far as the issues here are concerned, is thoroughly stereotyped and
is sufficiently small so that the benefits of individual recovery are not worth the
price of litigating individual claims ....
With these indicia present, I think it appropriate. . . to consider distribution
of damages to the class as a whole rather than to adopt. . . an inflexible mold of
recovery running to specific class members.
52 F.R.D. at 264. Although the Eisen court was applying this reasoning to a class action for
damages resulting from violations of the laws regulating the sale of securities, it is equally
applicable to actions for damages to consumers resulting from violations of the antitrust laws.
But see Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (fluid
recovery may be unconstitutional in antitrust suits).
The fluid class recovery concept was also used by the court in West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). For a discussion of
this method of distributing damages in large class actions, see Malina, Fluid Class Recovery
As a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 477, 477 (1972).
'- 15 U.S.C.A. § 15e (West Supp. 1978) provides for the distribution of damages as
follows:
Monetary relief recovered in an action under [this section] shall(1) be distributed in such manner as the district court in its discretion
may authorize; or
(2) be deemed a civil penalty by the court and deposited with the State
as general revenues; subject in either case to the requirement that any
distribution procedure adopted afford each person a reasonable opportunity to secure his appropriate portion of the net monetary relief.
See id. Alternatively, the court may distribute the recovery fund directly to claimants.
Id.
104H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2585-86; LEGISLATVE ANALYsis No. 7, supra note 17, at 10-11. This
approach was used in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
" See LEoIsLATwE ANALYsIs No. 7, supra note 17, at 9-10. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
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permits the states to use whatever means are practicable to apprise
injured citizens of their right to make a claim against the recovery
106
fund.
In enacting this innovative legislation, Congress considered the
fact that "[t]he economic burden of many antitrust violations is
borne in large measure by the consumer in the form of higher prices
for his goods and services." 107 The Act's sponsors further noted that
antitrust violations have contributed to the current problem of inflation in the national economy. 08 Recognizing that "[flederal antitrust statutes do not presently provide effective redress for the
injury inflicted upon consumers,"'0 9 Congress attempted to create a
vehicle through which the claims of injured consumers could be
vindicated." 0
The Illinois Brick Court did not find this strong expression of
congressional intent persuasive. The Court correctly observed that
lin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the representative plaintiff in a
class action brought pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 must furnish and pay for individual notice
to all those class members whose names and addresses are ascertainable. This requirement,
which imposes a substantial financial burden upon the plaintiff, has had a chilling effect on
the use of the class action as a device to vindicate the rights of large groups of claimants with
relatively small individual claims. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (quoting James Halverson, Dir. of FTC Bureau of Competition), reprinted in [19761 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2576-77.
-6 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(b)(1) (West Supp. 1978). Television, radio and newspaper
advertisements would be acceptable forms of notice under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. See
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 7, supra note 17, at 9-10.
107H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2573.
"I H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2573.
D Id. See also Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 628-29 (parenspatriaeconcept was
an attempt to avoid manageability problem which has caused many courts to refuse to certify
class actions).
"I H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2573. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15d (West Supp. 1978) provides as follows:
In any action under [this statute], in which there has been a determination
that a defendant agreed to fix prices in violation of [the Sherman Act], damages
may be proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods,
by the computation of illegal overcharges, or by such other reasonable system of
estimating aggregate damages as the court in its discretion may permit without the
necessity of separately proving the individual claim of, or amount of damage to,
persons on whose behalf the suit was brought.
This section of the new statute was expressly designed to minimize problems of proof and
manageability. H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1975), reprinted in [19761
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2583-85; see LEGIsLATivE ANALYSIS No. 7, supra note 17,
at 10. It is interesting to note that the methods for determining damages approved by Congress in its enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act are precisely those methods rejected by
the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, see note 33 supra, and Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 73133-
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the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is a procedural measure which does not
establish new substantive rights."' Thus, insofar as the Court determined that indirect purchasers have no substantive rights under the
Clayton Act, the existence of this new statute did not affect the
outcome of the case."' There are, however, strong indications in the
legislative history that Congress acted upon the assumption that
indirect purchasers do indeed have a right of recovery under the
Clayton Act." 3 Citing In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,," in

which the court accepted an offensive passing-on argument, Congress noted what it believed to be a trend among the federal courts
to recognize this right.15 Moreover, there are indications that Congress intended the ameliorative provisions of the Act specifically to
apply to situations in which an illegal overcharge had been passed
on to the consumer. During the course of the House debates on the
bill, Representative Rodino, one of its sponsors, stated:
[A]ssuming the State attorney general proves a violation, and
proves that an overcharge was "passed-on" to the consumers, injuring them "in their property"; that is, their pocketbooks-recoveries are authorized by the compromise bill whether
or not the consumers purchased directly from the price fixer, or
indirectly, from intermediaries,retailers or other middlemen. The

technical and procedural argument that consumers have no
"standing" whenever they are not "in privity" with the price fixer,
and have not purchased directly from him, is rejected by the compromise bill. Opinions relying on this procedural technicality...
are squarely rejected by the compromise bill."6
The Illinois Brick Court was not, of course, bound by this con"' 431 U.S. at 733 n.14; see H.R. REP. No. 94-499,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 2572, 2578-79.
"1431 U.S. at 733 n.14. The IllinoisBrick Court's conclusion that the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act did not give ultimate consumers a right of recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act
was anticipated in Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 647-48. For this reason, the authors
of the article concluded that the new statute would have little practical application. Id.
123 See 431 U.S. at 757 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to one commentator,
when the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion for certiorari in In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), many experts assumed that the Court was tacitly approving the offensive use of the passing-on theory. VON KAUNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 109.03[2].
114487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). The plaintiffs in
Western Liquid Asphalt had acquired the price-fixed product from various intermediary
contractors. They were seeking to recover treble damages from the wrongdoer under the
theory that the illegal overcharges had been passed on to them.
5 H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.4 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2576 n.4.
" 16 CONG. REC. H10295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Rodino) (emphasis

added); see H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1975), reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG.

&AD.

NEWS 2572, 2577.
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gressional assumption concerning the reach of the Clayton Act, and,
in the absence of a statute explicitly establishing a right of recovery
for indirect purchasers, the Court was free to conclude that no such
right existed." 7 Nonetheless, the Illinois Brick holding strips the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of virtually all significance. The new statute's coverage is confined to "natural persons" who are injured by
antitrust violations.1 18 All business entities are expressly excluded
from the scope of the Act.' 9 Under the Illinois Brick holding, however, the individual consumer is precluded from suing, except in
those rare instances where he has purchased directly from the
wrongdoer.' 20 Thus, although the parens patriae statute remains
nominally viable, its effectiveness as an enforcement tool has been
severely limited.
In effect, the Illinois Brick decision has eliminated the right of
individual consumers to recover for injuries sustained as a result of
antitrust violations.' 2' Presumably, such consumers could still
maintain an action against a retailer who has engaged in illegal
practices. In such situations, the consumer has had direct dealings
with the wrongdoer, apparently satisfying the requirements estab" Citing Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974), and National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass's v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n.34 (1967), the Illinois Brick Court noted that
the current opinions of particular legislators concerning the proper interpretation of a statute
such as the Clayton Act cannot retroactively alter the legislative intent that accompanied
the statute's enactment. Since, in the view of the Illinois Brick Court, indirect purchasers
were never intended to have a right to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the current
statements by legislators that they should have such a right, see note 116 supra, are of no
practical significance. According to the Court, if Congress now wishes to establish a new right
of action for indirect purchasers, it should do so by enacting specific substantive legislation.
431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14. In contrast, Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, stated that
Congress' view of the state of the law should be given greater weight:
It is difficult to see how Congress could have expressed itself more clearly. Even
if the question whether indirect purchasers could recover for damages passed on to
them was open before passage of the 1976 Act, . . . Congress' interpretation of § 4
in enacting the parenspatriaeprovision should resolve it in favor of their authority
to sue.
Id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,' 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1978).
,' 15 U.S.C.A. § 15g(3) (West Supp. 1978). The sponsors of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
believed that the consumer-oriented purposes of the Act would best be served by excluding
all parties except natural persons from the scope of its coverage. H.R. Rrp. No. 94-499, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2579.
"20Most consumer class actions brought under the antitrust laws involve passed-on overcharges resulting from horizontal price-fixing. See Malina, Fluid Class Recovery As A Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 477, 484 (1972).
12, The Supreme Court's holding in Illinois Brick has already resulted in the elimination
of antitrust suits brought by indirect purchasers. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Litigation,
75 F.R.D. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (amending certification of plaintiff class to exclude indirect
purchasers in light of Illinois Brick).
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lished in Illinois Brick. Consumer-retailer suits, however, represent
a very narrow category of antitrust litigation, since the majority of
antitrust violations occur before the product in question reaches the
retail level.'22 Therefore, by eliminating the availability of direct
actions as well as parens patriaesuits, the net effect of the Illinois
Brick decision will be to preclude consumers injured by this broad
class of violations from obtaining compensation.
The Illinois Brick decision can be viewed as an example of the
federal judiciary's tendency to resist involvement in complex, consumer oriented class action litigation.rs Four years earlier, the Supreme Court exhibited a similar tendency by rejecting congressional
efforts to expand and facilitate this type of legal action. In 1966,
Congress enacted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12 4
The rule was designed to eliminate technical impediments and create a procedural framework for litigating the interests of large and
diverse classes of plaintiffs.' 5 In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline,"'
12 See Malina, Fluid Recovery As A Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 477, 484 (1972).
"2 See Alioto & Donnici, supra note 2, at 211; Comment, To Right Mass Wrongs: A
Federal Consumer ClassAction Act, 13 HRv.J. LEois. 776, 788-92 (1976); Hochberger, U.S.
Weighs New Class-Action Rules, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 2. In Handler & Blechman,
supra note 6, at 628-29, the authors note that large class actions brought to vindicate the
claims of ultimate consumers have been notoriously unsuccessful. Many such claims have
been dismissed on the ground that they were unmanageable. E.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges,
500 F.2d 86, 89-92 (9th Cir. 1974); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 55354 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 70-74 (D.N.J. 1971);
Reinisch v. New York Stock Exch., 52 F.R.D. 561, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In other instances,
consumer claims were dismissed because the court found that the plaintiffs had not been
injured within the meaning of § 4. See note 39 supra.
One significant objection to the class action as a form of litigation is that it often produces more reward for the attorney than it does for the claimant. See Handler, Innovations,
supra note 23, at 628. Although the individual claimant's recovery may be very small, the
attorney's fee may run as high as 25% of the total recovery. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (mem.). But see Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), in which the court observed:
Those who criticize the class action on the grounds that it stirs up plaintiffs
and serves only to provide fees for attorneys overlook the fact that we are not
dealing with the traditional lawsuit which concerns primarily those litigants before
the court. The public's concern with openness and honesty. . . gives it an interest
no less significant than that of particular plaintiffs and defendants.
For a discussion of a recent Justice Department proposal for minimizing abuse of the classaction device by attorneys, see Hochberger, U.S. Weighs New Class-Action Rules, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 3, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
" See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 23,
28 U.S.C. app. at 7765 (1976).
"I See generally id.
12 417 U.S. 156 (1974), aff'g 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), re'g 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) and 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the Supreme Court superimposed notice requirements that were so
burdensome and costly as to actually discourage potential plaintiffs
from initiating class actions under Rule 23.127 Like the Illinois Brick
rule, the Eisen holding adopted a narrow, technical view of an innovative congressional initiative, thereby emasculating it.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that large multiparty and class action litigation presents a series of knotty problems for federal courts, particularly when
such litigation arises within the context of the antitrust laws. It is
equally clear that the introduction of the passing-on theory into civil
antitrust actions would necessarily "transform them into massive
efforts" 128 to sort out the rights and liabilities of a large number of
parties. Difficulties such as tracing the impact of a violation, ascertaining the fact, and amount of damages, allocating the recovery
fund among the competing claimants, and protecting the defendant
from multiple liability present strong arguments for limiting or even
excluding the passing-on theory from the field of civil antitrust litigation. This, in essence, was the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court in Illinois Brick.'2 There are, however, equally strong argu'"417 U.S. at 162. The Eisen case was a class action brought on behalf of all odd lot
traders who bought or sold securities during the period from May 1, 1962, to June 30, 1966.
The class was expected to include as many as 6 million potential claimants, of whom approximately 2 million were identifiable by name and address. 52 F.R.D. at 261. If the plaintiff's
claims were upheld, each class member was expected to recover less than $5.20 in damages.
It was estimated that individual notice to each of the 2 / million identifiable claimants
would cost over $225,000. Recognizing that such an initial outlay would place an almost
impossible burden upon the representative plaintiff, the district court devised a cost-saving
formula that minimized the requirement of individual notice and permitted notice by publication for certain classes of potential claimants. The use of this formula would have reduced
the cost of notifying class members to $21,720. 52 F.R.D. at 263. In addition, the district court
in Eisen had ruled that the defendants would have to pay 90% of the notice costs. Analogizing
to the criteria governing the granting of preliminary injunctions, the court reasoned that,
since the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits, he should have the benefit of assistance
on the initial cost of the lawsuit. 54 F.R.D. at 567. The court's underlying purpose was to
ensure that the case would be heard on its merits rather than being withdrawn or dismissed
due to overly burdensome notice requirements. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected these
relief measures, however, and held that each class member whose name and address were
ascertainable had to be given individual notice at the plaintiff's expense. Citing the statutory
language requiring "best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified," FED.R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), the Court determined
that constitutional due process mandated a more stringent notice procedure, even where such
a procedure would render the lawsuit financially prohibitive for the representative plaintiff.
417 U.S. at 173-77.
' 431 U.S. at 737.
,29It should be noted that one of the problems cited by the Illinois Brick Court, that of
allocating the recovery fund to a multitude of small claimants, was not really applicable to
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ments in favor of permitting the passing-on theory to be used offensively. The theory allows the party who has actually been injured
by an antitrust violation to sue the wrongdoer and thus promotes
the compensatory goal of the Clayton Act. Permitting the indirect
purchaser to sue also would be in accord with the broad antitrust
enforcement policies embodied in section 4. There are situations in
which a purchaser who deals directly with the wrongdoer would be
reluctant to pursue his claim, particularly when he can pass on any
overcharge to his customers.13 In such cases, allowing indirect purchasers to sue would prevent the wrongdoer from retaining his illegal profit. Finally, permitting the use of the offensive passing-on
theory in civil antitrust suits would be consistent with the developing policy of holding private industry accountable to the consuming
public. This policy has already found expression in the tort doctrine
of strict liability 3 1 and in the trend toward elimination of the privity
requirement in negligence 32 and breach of warranty actions.133 The
recently enacted Hart-Scott-Rodino Act can be viewed as a legislative effort to extend this policy to the field of civil antitrust law. 34
By its decision in Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court has stymied
these efforts and done much to reduce the accountability of private
industry to consumers.
The underlying concern of the Illinois Brick Court was that, if
plaintiffs were permitted to use the passing-on theory offensively,
the facts of the case. In contrast to the thousands of claimants in PhiladelphiaHous. Auth.
and Eisen, the Illinois Brick claimants were a relatively small group of municipal entities with
relatively large claims.
' The Illinois Brick Court acknowledged that "direct purchasers sometimes may refrain
from bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting relations with their suppliers." 431
U.S. at 746 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the Court concluded, without further explanation, that "on balance . . . the legislative purpose . . . is better served by holding direct

purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting
to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it." Id. Several other
courts and commentators have recognized that direct purchasers may prefer not to sue their
immediate suppliers. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589,
598 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 913-14; Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage
Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319, 1325 (1973); Note, The Effect of Hanover
Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-onDoctrine, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 98, 112 (1972).
"I See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, illinois Brick Co. v. illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977).
'11 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
"1 See Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); U.C.C. § 2-318; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel [Strict
Liability to the Consumer], 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124 (1960).
"' See notes 94-116 and accompanying text supra.
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civil antitrust suits would become wholly unmanageable. The Court
feared that, under such circumstances, the effectiveness of the civil
antitrust remedy would be placed in serious jeopardy. 35 Notwithstanding the merits of these concerns, enactment of the Hart-ScottRodino Act clearly indicates Congress' wish that the federal courts
be available to consumers injured by antitrust violations. 3"
Although the Illinois Brick ruling has severely hampered congressional efforts to hold the antitrust violator directly liable to the
consuming public, it is suggested that the federal courts may not be
able to ignore these underlying policy considerations indefinitely. 131
The trend toward providing a remedy for individual consumers who
have been injured by the illegal conduct of certain businesses has
become too firmly rooted in modern law to be reversed. It is likely
that, in the wake of Illinois Brick, Congress will enact remedial
legislation and clarify its intentions concerning the rights of individual consumers in civil antitrust suits.13 If this occurs, the federal
"1431 U.S. at 745. A related concern expressed by commentators is the fear that an
increase in complex class actions will overtax the federal courts and effectively overwhelm
the judiciary system. See, e.g., Handler, Innovations, supra note 23, at 4-5. Chief Justice
Burger expressed this concern when he observed that "the federal court system is for a limited
purpose, and lawyers, the Congress and the public must examine carefully each demand they
make on that system." Id. at 12 (quoting Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56
A.B.A.J. 929, 933 (1970)).
"' The sponsors of the parenspatriae bill noted that the provisions allowing aggregation
of damages, fluid recovery and the use of statistical methods for proving the extent of injury
should relieve the burdens placed upon the courts in consumer antitrust actions maintainable
under the statute. H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1975), reprintedin [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2584. Several commentators also have observed that
procedures such as those specified in the Act would render large civil antitrust actions more
feasible. See, e.g., Kohn, The Antitrust Class Action as a Social Instrument, 41 ANTITRUST
L.J. 288 (1971); McGuire, supra note 18, at 190-91; LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 7, supra note
17, at 9-10. In In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the
plaintiff was a government entity claiming treble damages as a representative of citizens who
had been injured by antitrust violations in the pharmaceutical industry. The Antibiotic court
stated:
It is far simpler to prove the amount of damage to the members of the class by
establishing their total damages than by collecting and aggregating individual
damage claims as a sum to be assessed against the defendants. And it is the court's
tentative conclusion that this can be done without sacrificing the rights of the
defendants.
Id. at 281. The Antibiotic court also noted that the problem of allocating the recovery fund
among the claimants could be resolved through the use of subclass litigation. Id.
"I It has been observed that the consumer antitrust class action has important social and
policy implications. See Kohn, The Antitrust Class Action as a Social Instrument, 41
ANTITRUST L.J. 288 (1972). See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
I'8 At this writing, Congress is considering specific legislation which would overrule
Illinois Brick and, in part, Hanover Shoe. The Senate measure, S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978), which was favorably reported out of the Judiciary Committee on June 14, 1978, would
amend § 4 by adding the following:
Sec. 41. (1) In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act, the fact
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that a person or the United States has not dealt directly with the defendant shall
not bar or otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant shall be
entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage claim, that the plaintiff
has passed on to others, who are themselves entitled to recover under section 4, 4A,
or 4C of this Act, some or all of what would otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage.
Id. § 12, reprintedin [1978] ANTITRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 870, at 12 (Spec. Supp.
June 29, 1978). Sponsors of the bill have stated that it is designed to eliminate "the mechanical test of directness versus indirectness," while leaving intact the traditional standing tests.
S. REP. No. 95-934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] ANrrrRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 870, at 9 (Spec. Supp. June 29, 1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.; Spec.
Supp.]; see note 23 supra.These tests presumably would remain available to prevent recovery by indirect purchasers whose injury is too remote. S. REP., reprinted in Spec. Supp.,
supra, at 5. In addition, although the passing-on defense generally would be available, it could
not be raised against direct purchasers if all injured indirect purchasers would be precluded
from suing under one of the standing tests. S. REP., reprinted in Spec. Supp., supra, at 9.
These symmetrical provisions were intended to prevent recovery by remote purchasers and,
at the same time, insure that at least one party will be able to maintain a suit. Id. Critics of
the bill, however, have suggested that this language is ambiguous and could be construed as
eliminating all standing requirements. S. REP., reprintedin Spec. Supp., supra, at 16 (Additional Views of Sen. James B. Allen).
The House measure approved by the Monopolies Subcommittee, H.R. 11942, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978), may present a similar problem. It provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any indirect purchaser in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution of goods or services shall, upon proof of payment of all or any part of any
overcharge for such goods or services, be deemed to be injured within the meaning
of section 4, 4A, or 4C of [the Clayton] Act.
(b) Any indirect seller in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution
of goods or services shall, upon proof of receipt of all or any part of any underpayment for such goods or services, be deemed to be injured within the meaning of
section 4, 4A, or 4C of [the Clayton] Act.
(c) In any action under section 4 or 4A ....
any defendant, as a partial or
complete defense . . . , shall be entitled to prove that(1) a purchaser in the chain who paid any overcharge passed on all
or any part of such overcharge to another purchaser in such chain; or
(2) a seller in the chain who received any underpayment passed on
all or any part of such underpayment to another seller in such chain.
H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(a)-(c) (1978), reprintedin [1978] ANrrRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 859, at F-1 (Apr. 13, 1978). The House version would also simplify the
evidentiary and multiple liability problems inherent in the passing-on theory by providing:
(e)(1) . . . [A]ny damage award in a final judgment heretofore or hereafter
rendered against any defendant in any action under section 4, 4A, or 4C of [the
Clayton] Act shall be admissible as(A) prima facie evidence against any plaintiff, and
(B) conclusive evidence against such defendant, in any other action
under section 4, 4A, or 4C of [the Clayton] Act brought against such
defendant, as to all fully and fairly litigated matters regarding the
amount of damages passed on which would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto.
H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(e)(1) (1978), reprinted in [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 859, at F-1 to -2 (Apr. 13, 1978). The estoppel effects of this provision
are not applicable, however, to consent judgments or consent decrees. Id. § 41(e)(2). Unlike
the Senate version, the House bill attempts to limit a defendant's total liability by requiring
that treble damages be computed solely on the basis of the amount of the illegal overcharge.
This provision is intended to eliminate the possibility that the defendant will be held liable
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courts will have little choice but to accommodate the complex and
sometimes unruly claims of large and diverse classes of plaintiffs.

Imaginative and innovative measures will have to be devised to
render these claims manageable. 39 Rather than attempt to further
obstruct the efforts of Congress by adopting overly technical rules,
the federal courts should make a positive contribution by helping
to shape new procedural tools for minimizing the practical problem
inherent in consumer antitrust litigation. " ' In Illinois Brick, the
Supreme Court acted in resistance to a clear congressional initiative. The field remains open, however, for the Court to work in
cooperation with Congress in shaping the rights and liabilities of the
parties in this challenging area of the law.
Lisabeth Harrison
for the "ripple effects" of his unlawful conduct. See [1978]

ANTITRUST

&

TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 869, at A-11 (June 22, 1978).
Among the most controversial features of both proposals is a provision that would make
the legislation retroactive to June 9, 1977, the date of the Illinois Brick decision. See S. 1874,
§ 4, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] ANTrr UsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 870, at 12 (Spec. Supp. June 22, 1978); [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 869, at A-11 (June 28, 1978). Proponents of the retroactivity provision state that it is
necessary to preserve over $800 million in indirect purchaser claims which were pending in
the courts before the IllinoisBrick decision was handed down. See [1978] ANTrRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 866, at A-4 (June 1, 1978). The bills' critics, however, have argued that
the retroactive provisions raise serious constitutional problems. See S. REP. No. 95-935, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (Minority and Additional views), reprinted in [1978] ANTTRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 870, at 15 (Spec. Supp. June 29, 1978).
'3 The need for the development of innovative and imaginative procedural approaches
to the consumer antitrust class action has been noted in City & County of Denber v. American
Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 639 (D. Colo. 1971); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Kohn, The Antitrust Class Action As a Social Instrument, 41
ANTTRUST L.J. 288 (1971). Recently, the Justice Department has begun to explore proposals
for improving the methods by which large class actions involving small individual claims are
handled in the federal courts. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 1, at 51, col. 1.
"I It has been observed that the federal courts are the most appropriate forum for resolving large consumer antitrust suits, since they have extensive experience in handling complex
litigation and a capacity to handle geographically dispersed claims. Comment, To Right Mass
Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class Action Act, 13 HARv. J. LEGIs. 776, 792-93 (1976).

